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  In a recent article, Robert Solow (1997), paraphrasing Oscar Wilde, described modern 
economics as “the overeducated in pursuit of the unknowable.” In a previous article on the future 
of economics (Colander 1999) I developed that theme, but I also argued that economics was 
headed for a quite different future, one in which economics would become “the appropriately 
educated in pursuit of the knowable.”
1 In this paper I expand upon those ideas, explaining where 
I see the process of change now, and how I see it changing the way we do and teach economics 
in the future. 
The Process of Change 
  To think about the future of economics one must have a theory of how and why the study 
of economics changes. Heterodox economists, often implicitly, see that process of change as 
occurring through an outside revolution, as mainstream economists see their mistaken ways and 
change their views to a new reality. In this view change comes from the outside—ideally from 
heterodox economist’s views being accepted. I don’t see it that way. Most of the change in 
economics has come about from the inside, from young professors at top schools who start doing 
economics in a different way than was previously done. These changes occur because (1) 
technological changes in analytic and computing methods open up new avenues of study, and (2) 
because the “low hanging fruit” from previous approaches and methods have already been 
picked.
2 
  How much of this change is allowed, and how it works its way through the profession, is 
a complicated process that I have explored in a forthcoming book, The Changing Face of 
Economics. (Colander, Holt and Rosser, forthcoming) In it we interview individuals on the 
cutting edge of change in the profession. What we find is that most of the change takes place in a 
slow evolutionary process that relies on elite individuals within the profession being open to 
change, but that the actual change takes place through the replicator dynamics of the profession. 
By that I mean that most economists do variations of what they were taught to do, and do not 
change much. Instead, the key to understanding change is the choices new graduate students are 
making about dissertation topics. These choices are tied to technology, to the analytic methods 
that they come to graduate school with, and to the analytic methods that they learn in graduate 
school. In my view the profession changes not because of radical changes in existing 
                                                 
1 Obviously I cannot be sure what Solow meant by his comment. My interpretation of what he mean is that 
economics at the turn of the millennium set too high goals for itself in trying to understand the deep theory of the 
economy, and that perhaps it would do better to set lower goals, finding usable relationships among variables, and 
concentrating on analysis that accepted the data limitations faced by economists.  
2 The incentives directing the choices are built into the institutions of the economic profession. I have explored these 
incentives in Klamer and Colander (1990) and Colander (1991). Future of Economics 
economist’s research, although some of that does occur, but instead through an evolutionary 
process brought about by the hiring and retirement process. 
  Graduate schools usually have a variety of different approaches represented in their 
faculty that are broader than what is often described as the normal orthodoxy, but which do not 
include many approaches that are defined as heterodox. Graduate students are attracted to those 
professors using approaches that seem dynamic and likely to result in publications and 
advancement. Over time there is a subtle change in the professors to which graduate students are 
attracted; older professors, who are using older analytic technology, get fewer graduate students; 
younger professors, who are using newer and more advanced techniques, get more. This creates 
a dynamic toward different, and more and more advanced techniques becoming the norm. As 
they do the selection committees look for new students who are better trained in the new analytic 
techniques being emphasized, which furthers the process of change.  
  As time passes, younger, differently trained, economists replace older economists, and 
the average image of what economics is and how one does economics changes. Since the 
profession replaces itself every 35 years or so, I estimate the underlying rate of change from this 
evolutionary process at about 3% per year. However, even that rate of change may be an over-
estimate of the degree of change in the initial stages of a cycle of change, because most students 
choose to work with established professors in established methodologies; they do so because the 
newer methodologies and techniques are risky. Initially only a few risk-preferrers choose that 
path. So, at the beginning of a cycle of change, the rate of change toward a new acceptable 
approach is smaller than that 3%, probably closer to 1%. However, at some point a critical mass 
of work is accumulated, a shift point occurs, the new approach becomes the hot approach, and 
students flock toward it. At that time the rate of change increases to greater than 3%. 
  Because of this process, economics is becoming increasingly technical, and will continue 
to do so. Students are better trained in mathematics, statistics, and analytic methods. Computing 
power has increased, so that economists now coming into the field approach problems in 
different ways than did earlier economists. This increase in the technical nature of the field has 
sometimes been associated with formalism, and for a while in the late 20
th century it was, but the 
modern technical developments have actually allowed a movement away from formalism, and 
toward a more applied mathematical approach. 
  This move toward more technical, but less formal, work is driven by increasing 
computing power. With computer power doubling every 18 months, the need to rely on analytic 
solutions decreases and the ability to extract information from data increases. Both of these 
effects reduce the value of analytic deductive theory. One can get one’s insights from the data 
and from simulations, reducing one’s reliance on the deductive theory that characterized 
formalism. Because of the predicted increase in computing power I see modern economics 
becoming more and more technical, and less and less limited by deductive formalism. 
Eventually, economists will have virtual economic simulations in which they can study 
alternative policies. These virtual economies will form the centerpiece of economist’s tool kits. 
But that is far in the future. Now, we are taking only the initial steps away from our previous 
deductive approach.  
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Moving Away from the Holy Trinity 
  This movement away from deductive analytics is probably best seen in the way in which 
younger economists treat the holy trinity assumptions of rationality, greed and equilibrium. 
These assumptions were the foundations of the deductive analytic approach, and were previously 
treated as sacrosanct. Changing them meant giving up one’s foundation of theory. Modern 
economics is slowly moving away from the holy trinity, and toward a broader foundation of 
economic theory of purposeful behavior, enlightened self-interest and sustainability.  
  The changes that are occurring can be seen in a variety of theoretical work, such as work 
in behavioral economics, evolutionary game theory, agent based modeling, experimental 
economics, and new institutional economics.
3 Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere (Colander, 
Holt and Rosser, forthcoming) much of the work that is considered cutting edge theoretical work 
falls into the category of moving away from the holy trinity.  
  One can see the movement in the allocation of recent awards in economics. For example, 
Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith recently won a Nobel Prize for their work in behavioral and 
experimental economics and Mat Rabin won the John Bates Clark medal for work on behavioral 
economics. Because of these changes today one would no longer describe modern economics as 
neoclassical economics. (Colander 2000a) I do not want to overstate the degree of change that is 
currently taking place in the profession; one sees only slight change in the work of most existing 
economists. But, because of my view of the process of change that I described above, I see these 
small changes as an indicator of much larger future changes, although those changes will likely 
occur in a series of sudden jumps, rather than in a smooth progression.  
  To make predictions about how these changes are altering the field of economics requires 
one to make decisions on what new assumptions and techniques will be chosen, and speed up the 
evolutionary process, looking at changes in generations, not in decades. Thus, I argue that the 
small steps that we are currently taking in modifying the assumptions of theory portend major 
changes in the future for how economics, and economic policy, is thought about. To consider just 
one example: theorists such as Jean Tirole (Tirole forthcoming), following up on the work of 
Thomas Schelling, are now considering how individuals struggle to restrict their own behavior. 
In doing so the theorists are accepting that an individual’s actions may not in some broader sense 
reflect what the individual truly wants to do. That change, if adopted more generally, has 
enormous implications for change in applied policy issues; for example it can justify a whole 
range of taxes or restrictions on behavior, which from our current theory, would be unjustifiable.  
Where the Changes Are Heading 
  In this paper my interest is not so much in the particular changes that are taking place, but 
in the overall effect of the sum total of them, and in the direction that I see those changes taking 
                                                 
3 That is close to happening in behavioral economics in certain fields such as finance. As Richard Thaler has said, 
once, people asked what was behavioral finance; now people ask what other type of finance is there? A leading 
indicator of the changes that are occurring, one looks at the hiring priorities of top schools, and the needs their 
hiring departments see. In the early 2000s behavioral economics is seen as a hiring priority; experimental 
economics is not yet a totally accepted hiring priority, and agent based modeling is hardly on the horizon
3 
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economics and economics teaching in the future. My thesis is that the changes involve a major 
shift in the underlying vision of what economists study, and how they study it. Specifically, I see 
the changes leading from a vision that sees economics as the study of infinitely bright agents in 
information rich environments to a vision of economics as the study of reasonably bright 
individuals in information poor environments.  
  Another way of describing my thesis is that the vision of the economy will evolve from 
its previous vision of highly complex, “simple system” to a highly complex “complex system.”
4 
Simple systems, no matter how complex, are reducible to a low dimensional set of equations, 
making it possible to model the system analytically. A complex system is not so reducible, and 
must be represented in another fashion—through simulation, or through insights gained with 
replicator dynamics. One never has a full analysis of the entire complex system.  
  Simple and complex systems differ in their micro foundations. Simple systems can be 
studied from micro foundations alone. Complex systems involve emergent properties, and cannot 
be understood from an analysis of the elements of the components of that system. There can still 
be micro foundations, but the micro foundations of complex systems are contextual, and can only 
be understood in reference to the existing system. Such complex systems are built up in path 
dependent stages, making individual optimization within such systems history and institution 
specific. This means that its institutional structure is central to understanding complex systems, 
and that any assumed rationality must involve some boundedness.
5 
  The acceptance of this complexity vision of the economy involves a shift in economics 
far more fundamental than anything associated with the movements away from the holy trinity 
that the profession has made so far. But by moving away from the holy trinity economics is 
making the first step toward such a new vision.
6 
Understanding the Nature of the Change 
  Jokes about the economics profession are often revealing of the self-image that the 
profession has of itself. One joke that is often told to make fun of economists’ deductive and 
non-practical tendencies is the can opener joke. In it a physicist and a chemists offer practical 
solutions to a problem of opening a can on a desert island, while the economist offers a useless 
solution--to assume a can opener.
7 That joke is not very complementary of economists and it 
provoked a less well-known joke that portrays economics in a better light. The joke is the 
following: 
                                                 
4 For a discussion of what is meant my complex system see Ayung (2000) 
5 These ideas are developed in Colander (2000b). 
6 Of course the simplicity view has not always been the view of economics and thus the movement toward 
complexity will be a movement back to earlier writers, including Smith, Marshall, and Hayek. See Colander 
(2000c) for a discussion of the complexity in the history of economic thought, and Colander (forthcoming-a) for a 
discussion of how economics moved from a vision of an economy as a complex system to a vision of the economy 
as a complex simple system.  
7 The joke is so well known that I do not repeat it here, but those who do not know it can find it at 
www.aeaweb.org/RFE/Neat/JokJokAboEco.html.  
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  A physicist, an engineer, and an economist are given a watch, a string, and a ball and are 
told that the person who can best measure the height of a building will get into a Scientific Hall 
of Fame. The physicist ties the ball to the string and hangs it down from the roof. Using the 
stopwatch, he calculates the length of time it takes the pendulum to swing from side to side. 
From that information he estimates the height of the building. The engineer takes the ball and 
drops it off the top. He then uses the stopwatch to determine how long it takes to fall, and 
estimates the height of the building accordingly. The economist, however, wins the place in the 
Hall of Fame by taking the stopwatch, trading it for the building plans with a guard in the 
building, and simply reading the height of the building from the blueprints.  
  This joke, obviously made up by an economist, shows both the benefits of trade and the 
importance of economic theory. That theory provides a blueprint of how the economy operates, 
and thus is to be guarded at all costs once found. It also shows that economist’s assumption that 
the economy is a complex “simple” system, because those are the only systems for which one 
can find a complete set of blueprints.  
  The problems with this story from a complexity point of view are the assumptions that a 
set of blueprints exists, or that the building of the economy actually followed that set of 
blueprints if they did exist. The complexity vision sees the economy as emergent from a set of 
simple decisions in a way that no one previously pictured. Thus the complexity addendum to this 
story, which Robert Bassman suggested to me in private discussions, is that when the building 
took place, the builders made adjustments to the plans, which they never marked down on the 
blueprints. The economist reading from the blueprints got the wrong answer.  
  The questioning of the holy trinity can be seen as a movement away from a search for the 
blueprints of the economic system, and toward a search for understanding a system in which the 
blueprints are missing or nonexistent. Consider rationality. In order to achieve a blueprint of the 
economy strong rationality must be assumed, where individuals have information about all 
other’s actions, and can determine what they will do given that information. The models one 
derives given these strong assumptions are justifiable because they provide the blueprint for the 
economy—once we have that blueprint we can proceed to discussions of practical issues. 
Behavioral economics is a direct challenge to that belief—it involves a different sense of theory 
and of rationality; a behavioral economist looks at what people do, and builds in those 
observations into his or her assumptions about behavior in his or her models. Behavioral 
economics is designed for economists operating without blueprints.  
  The “simple” approach relies on theory, uses empirical observation to test the theory, and 
then builds policy analysis around that “empirically tested” theory. The “complexity” approach 
relies on empirical observation, builds theory around those observations, and then builds policy 
around the resultant “empirically-determined” theory.
8 The type of rationality assumed is a key 
difference in the two approaches. Both assume rationality—all models of economics must 
assume some type of rationality—but there is a difference in the type of rationality and the level 
of information assumed.  
                                                 
8 I have called the resultant applied policy “muddling through” approach to policy to be contrasted with the 
economics of control approach to policy in the “simple” economy. (Brock and Colander, forthcoming a, b) 
5 6/17/03 Future of Economics 
The work done at CeNDEF (http://www.fee.uva.nl/cendef) is an example of the approach 
I have in mind that will become the dominant approach in the future. Researchers there are 
combining new and old strategies to address fundamental questions. For example their 
theoretical work is calibrated to reproduce many features of real world data, but is based on 
heterogeneous agents with differing degrees of rationality, rather than on homogeneous agents. 
Their choice of assumptions is further governed by experimental and econometric work using 
field data. They study how changing the degree (e.g., the "dial") of rationality creates dynamical 
patterns in their artificial economies, which are then compared to dynamical patterns observed in 
actual economies. They use complexity tools such as bifurcation theory to study these pattern-
generating mechanisms analytically as well as computationally. 
The Technical Nature of the Economics of the Future 
  Prior to recent technological developments in nonlinear dynamics, chaos theory, 
complexity theory, and in computing power that allows researchers to gain insight into systems 
without analytics, anyone (such as Ronald Coase, Douglass North, or Oliver Williamson) who 
felt the economy was complex, was forced to take a heuristic approach. That heuristic approach 
was not consistent with the scientific vision that economics had of itself. The formal alternative 
to that approach was the general equilibrium theory such as seen in the work of Gerard Debreu. 
At the time this formal approach was developed, using heuristics to explore the complexity 
vision was reasonable because in the complexity vision even the most technical approach at the 
time was far too simple to achieve much insight if the economy was truly complex.  
  The difficulty for heuristic analysis in the profession is that it tends to be 
nonreproducible. It is dependent on the researcher having original insights and the personality to 
make others take those insights seriously. Few graduate students, even top ones, have those 
abilities. Most take an existing technique and apply it.
9Technical work is far more reproducible; 
it exhibits significant increasing returns to scale. For that reason I believe that the non-technical 
work of North, Williamson, or Coase is not the future of economics. Instead the future of 
economics is increasingly technical work that is founded on the vision that the economy is a 
complex system.  
  Again, I want to emphasize that the technical future I see is not an extension of the past. 
The nature of that technical work will change from highly technical pure mathematical work to 
highly technical applied mathematical work. The pure mathematical approach that I believe is in 
decline follows in the tradition of Hilbert—it is technical in the sense that it is deductive pure 
mathematics and attempts to establish an axiomatic foundation for the field. The economics that 
was “in” in the 1960s and 1970s was closely tied to this approach—the Arrow/Debreu proof of 
                                                 
9 For example, one of the reasons Milton Friedman had many followers in macro because he offered students the 
chance to do money demand and permanent income studies using data from a variety of different countries and 
newly developed econometric techniques. Similarly, one of the reasons Paul Samuleson had many students 
because he offered students a chance to develop one of the many models that he had structured. One of the reasons 
Ken Bolding and Abba Lerner had few graduate students because they did not offer students a set of dissertation 
topics that were the application of a fairly clear technique to a slightly different set of problems. 
6 6/17/03 Future of Economics 
general equilibrium and the extensive work that followed in that Arrow/Debreu tradition are 
examples.
10 
  A pure axiomatic approach attempts to start with a minimal number of assumptions and 
arrive at as many conclusions as possible from those assumptions. As economics developed its 
core assumptions in the 1950s, the holy trinity set of assumptions--greed, rationality, and 
equilibrium--came to be accepted as the pillars upon which theory was to be based. There were 
obviously many differences in how these three pillars were used, but in the pure theory of 
economics they were well specified, and the Walrasian general equilibrium program (called that 
even though Walras likely would have disagreed with significant portions of it) made them 
central to its goals. It asked such questions as: Can we prove existence and stability of 
equilibrium given the specification of these assumptions? This axiomatic approach is a deductive 
approach that starts with first principles and builds up a theory from which policy implications 
are drawn. Then, and only then, are those implications empirically tested.  
  This axiomatic approach requires parsimony in assumptions. Because of the intricate way 
in which assumptions are tied to empirical observations and policy implications, a slight change 
in the specification of core assumptions can change implications drastically. Thus, once the 
initial assumptions are chosen, they became highly entrenched and almost unchangeable.  
  It was this axiomatic approach that a number of us were reacting against in the 1980s 
when we started our campaign to change economics. (Klamer and Colander (1990), Colander 
and Brenner (1992)) However, we weren’t quite the rebels that we seemed. In fact, in that 
campaign we were swimming very much with the current, which is why our work led to the 
establishment of the COGEE commission in the U.S. and why there was a decreased ranking of 
the axiomatic approach by the economics profession. While the axiomatic approach remains 
today, it is, in my view, far less dominant than it was. In the future of economics that I see 
axiomatic theory is no longer the central approach to be supplemented by applied and empirical 
work. In the future, the relationship will be the other way around: axiomatic work supplements 
applied and empirical work.  
  The first step away from that axiomatic approach is currently taking place as the pillars of 
the axiomatic approach have become far more flexible, which means that there are no absolute 
deductive implications that follow from core theory. As the former axiomatic foundations of 
economics are abandoned, economists are turning away from pure mathematics and toward 
applied mathematics. The approach of applied mathematics to studying a subject is 
fundamentally different than the approach used in the pure mathematical approach. In the 
applied mathematics approach, mathematics is not the foundation of the theory but is simply a 
tool to be used to aid one’s intuition and applied policy work.  
  The applied mathematical approach is, at its core, an empirical approach in which 
intuition guides one’s thinking. Mathematics and statistics are used as an extension of the brain 
                                                 
10 This axiomatic approach follows a tradition in economics that goes back to David Ricardo (but not to Adam Smith 
or John Stuart Mill). See Weintraub (2002) for an interesting discussion of these issues.  
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to aid in the analysis. The work does not attempt to provide a deductive foundation to economics, 
but instead serves as a tool for reasoning and pulling information out of data.  
  This change from the axiomatic approach to applied mathematical approach is 
symbolized by two conferences held nearly a decade apart at the Santa Fe Institute. The first, 
held in the mid 1980s, generated a book entitled The Economy as a Complex Evolving System 
(Anderson, Arrow, and Pines, 1988). Waldrop (1992) reported that this conference featured a set 
of largely mainstream economists and defenders of general equilibrium orthodoxy, assembled by 
Kenneth Arrow, and a set of physicists assembled by others. At that first conference the 
economists mostly attempted to defend their axiomatic approach, facing sharp challenges and 
ridicule from the physicists for holding relatively simplistic views.  
  The second conference held in the mid 1990s saw a very different outcome and 
atmosphere than the first. (Arthur, Durlauf, and Lane, 1997) No longer were mainstream 
economists defensively adhering to general equilibrium orthodoxy. Now they were using 
methods adopted from biologists and physicists, many suggested at the earlier conference, in 
innovative ways. They were much more open to complex economic analysis.  
  These two Santa Fe conferences are representative of the change that occurred throughout 
the profession during this time. It was as if the ideas planted by earlier researchers in many areas, 
such as experimental economics, behavioral economics, and nonlinear dynamics, were taking 
root. Today the mainstream of the profession has accepted many of the methods and approaches 
that are associated with the complexity, applied mathematics, approach.  
Changes In Economic Policy Analysis 
  The change in the approach to theorizing will be supplemented by a change in the 
approach to applied policy. Currently, the textbooks teach an applied policy approach that 
follows from the axiomatic approach to theory. It focuses on efficiency to the exclusion of other 
goals. Given appropriate assumptions, the economy will arrive at an efficient outcome. If there 
are externalities government action is necessary to internalize those externalities; textbook 
economics policy discussions focus on policies designed to guide the economy to a Pareto 
optimal position. Efficiency, interpreted as maximizing output independent of the distribution of 
that output, is currently the central focus of textbook policy models.  
  How we got to that point is an interesting story of its own. It begins with the 
philosophical approach to policy in the Grand Tradition associated with Smith and Mill. In that 
tradition laissez faire was supported for a variety of reasons—achieving efficiency was one of 
them, but not necessarily the most important. In the late 1800s, economists saw a smaller role for 
economists in policy, operating in their capacity as an economist, than did earlier economists. 
Both J.N. Keynes and Alfred Marshall focused on limited applicability of pure theory for policy, 
and suggested that applied policy should be considered an art, outside of both positive and 
normative economics, rather than a science.  
  Pigou backed away from this differentiation between art and positive economics, and 
attempted to provide a seamless flow from positive theory to policy precepts. Inherent in his 
model, however, was a material welfare approach to utility theory, an approach in which 
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economics was only a subset of analysis that was to go into policy, the subset being “that part of 
social welfare which can be brought, directly or indirectly, into relation with the measuring-rod 
of money.”
11 Pigou’s work began the movement to modern welfare economics, but it was a quite 
different welfare economics than we know today, for example, it had economists supporting 
progressive taxation on the basis of economic theory. The reason Pigou could support such 
policies was that he took for granted that there was diminishing marginal utility and that a 
redistribution toward low wages earners would increase social welfare.  
  The next step in the progression to modern welfare economics was Lionel Robbins’ 
change in the interpretation of utility from a material welfare interpretation of utility, to an 
ordinalist interpretation of utility--what Pareto called ophelimity. The material welfare 
interpretation of utility referred to usefulness, was determinable by introspection, and was 
comparable across averages of individuals. Ophelimity referred to satisfaction of desire; it was 
not determinable, and was not comparable among individuals. Material welfare economists 
focused on utility; ordinalist neoclassicals focused on ophelimity. That shift made economics 
apply to all goods, not just to material welfare that involved a set of generally accepted, but 
unprovable, assumptions about the nature and comparability of utility functions. This change in 
approach redirected economics to a policy focus on efficiency to the exclusion of other goals. 
Other goals involved subjective reasoning and should not be part of positive economics. 
 Lerner’s  Economics of Control (1944) integrated Pigou’s arguments with Robbins 
interpretation of utility, and placed them into a general, rather than a partial, equilibrium 
framework. In doing so Lerner established the framework for policy that still is central to the 
textbook presentation of economic policy, although he attempted to maintain a bias toward 
redistribution by his uncertainty approach to utility.
12 That framework has been much refined 
since then, with the new welfare economics and the new new welfare economics, but the central 
elements of Lerner’s economics of control framework, minus his attempt to provide a rational for 
redistribution, remains the central policy vision taught in the economics texts.
13  
  The textbook framework for policy analysis centers on efficiency and deviations from 
optimality because of externalities, and leads economists to think of micro policy, and of the role 
of economists in the policy process, within that framework. In actual fact, much micro economic 
analysis takes place with little regard to this framework, and is primarily an analysis of relations 
among variables and common sense theory, but the structural foundations for policy, and the 
framework within which economists think of policy remains within Lerner’s economics of 
control framework. The movement away from the holy trinity is a movement away from the 
economics of control foundation for applied policy, and any deductive underpinnings for 
economic policy. It forces applied policy back into J.N Keynes’ art.  
  The complexity vision of the economy is inconsistent with that economics of control 
framework, and thus if it is accepted it will mean a major difference in how economic policy is 
thought about. The policy approach consistent with complexity is a muddling through approach, 
                                                 
11 See Cooter and Rappaport (1984) for a discussion of the material welfare approach.  
12 I discuss this development in much more detail in Colander (2003) 
13 This approach is challenged by economists such as Amaytya Sen (1999), but his work generally does not make it 
into the principles or even intermediate textbooks.  
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which is more closely related to the work of Smith, Marshall, Hayek, Coase, and Sen than it is to 
the Lerner tradition. I call it a muddling through approach to policy, because in a complex 
environment the best policy makers can do is to muddle through.  
  To understand what I mean by a muddling through approach, consider the building of the 
beautiful and amazing medieval cathedrals. That building did not rely on knowledge of scientific 
laws to guide the building, but instead relied on accumulated rules of thumb of what worked and 
what didn’t. The building proceeded by trial and error. Different methods of construction would 
be pushed to the limit until a cathedral caved in somewhere, and then the rules of thumb would 
change. As the stored knowledge increased, the cathedrals became more grandiose, even without 
a specific understanding of the laws underlying them. That came much later. Muddling through 
policy follows that same approach. It is conducting policy without a full knowledge of the 
general laws of the economy, if there are any. What you can find, at best, are general rules of 
thumb for how things have worked in the past, and possibly some exploitable patterns.
14 
Muddling through is not building without rules; it is simply building without an ultimate set of 
blueprints, which makes the rules far more tentative and cautionary.  
  In muddling through economic reasoning is directed by an educated common sense, and 
what Tom Schelling has called the “vicarious problem solving” approach. In it one informally 
models the situation assuming agents “operate in a purposeful manner, aware of their values and 
alert to their opportunities.” Using this approach the researcher figures out what an agent might 
do by imagining him or herself in the person’s position, as best he understands that position, and 
decides what that person will likely do given that person’s aims, values, objectives, and 
constraints. (Schelling 2003) It is a type of armchair theorizing that most economists do. 
  But there are two differences. The first is that in muddling through this armchair 
theorizing is only the beginning of the analysis. It is the exploratory work that then will be 
supplemented by a variety of highly technical work, which will provide a foundation for the 
temporary solution to the problem one works out. This work might include field studies, agent 
based modeling, statistical data analysis and a variety of other techniques that might shed light 
on the issue. The second difference is that the assumptions about the agents will reflect how 
actual agents operate, and not any predetermined sense of rationality. Thus, the agents being 
modeled will be characterized by one’s understanding of oneself, and insights from psychology.  
  Initially, the changes in policy analysis associated with the complexity revolution will 
come slowly and will be appended to existing thinking. Thus, the first set of policy proposal 
changes that are coming from behavioral economics involve slight addendums to standard 
economic results. These changes are acquiring the name benign paternalism (Benjamin and 
Laibson forthcoming) or libertarian paternalism. (Sunnstein and Thaler forthcoming) In this 
policy work one uses the insights coming from behavioral work in economics to modify the way 
in which policy is implemented. For example, one of the insights of behavioral work is that 
                                                 
14 Now, even in a muddling through approach searching for a set of architectural plans can make sense for indeed 
they might exist. Thus, I would expect that in the future a few individuals will continue to search for them; abstract 
theory based on pure math has a role to play in the future. But it is only one strategy in the process, not a strategy 
to put all ones marbles in. The majority of the applied policy work will be about solving particular problems with 
whatever technical tools are available to them. 
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preferences are often ill formed. This fact means that small, seemingly innocuous, differences in 
the institutional environment, such as in how a choice is presented to an individual, play 
important roles in outcomes of policies. Libertarian paternalism involves structuring choices in a 
way that lead to results that the policy maker believes in best for the individual.  
  An example that advocates of this policy use is the structure of savings plans in which 
individuals must choose whether they want to automatically save or not.
15 If the policy maker 
structures the program with the default option being that the agent saves, approximately 80% 
choose saving; if he or she structures the default option as one in which the agent does not save 
only 30% choose to save. If the paternalistic policy maker believes saving is good, he or she 
structures the program so that the default option is saving. In doing so the individual’s consumer 
sovereignty is not being violated, because he or she is choosing whether he or she wants to save, 
and may change at will. But by taking advantage of insights from psychology and structuring 
saving as the default option, the policy maker is guiding that choice to the one that the policy 
maker believes is best for the person.  
The Slippery Slope 
  Libertarian paternalism seems like it involves only a small change in policy implications, 
and that it can be added as an addendum to standard welfare arguments of economics. In my 
view, that is not the case. Accepting the psychological assumptions upon which it is based 
undermines standard welfare theory, and thus cannot be appended to it. Instead, the implications 
for future change in policy analysis of accepting the implications of psychological insights are 
substantial. There is no reason for the policy maker to stop at libertarian policies. Accepting 
psychology’s insight and giving up the rationality and greed foundation for policy means 
accepting that people’s actions do not necessarily reflect what they would “really” want. 
Psychology shows that individual’s choices are influenced by a variety of factors and can be 
directed in many ways, (an insight that has not gone unnoticed by many real world firms.) Thus, 
based on standard economic theory without the rationality pillar, there is no reason to stop at 
libertarian policies. If one accepts that policy makers have some insight into what is good for 
individuals separate from what they actually choose, a premise that is the basis of libertarian 
paternalism, then there is nothing in existing standard economic theory to state that one should 
not go further. For example, why not design policies that take into account individual’s tendency 
to exhibit hyperbolic discounting, and design policies to restrict immediate choice, by guiding 
individuals toward precommitment against immediate gratification? Such policies would get 
significant support among liberal economists. 
  One can easily go further. Once one accepts that people’s actions do not necessarily 
reflect what they really want, there is no theoretical reason within the economics of control 
framework to restrict individual behavior to get people to do what is good for them. For example, 
Robert Frank (1999) argues that a set of goods, which could be called relational goods, are 
primarily desired because others have them, which means that individual’s welfare from a 
variety of luxury goods is determined by what one has relative to others. In that case, a policy of 
taxing luxuries can bring in revenue to the government and actually improve social welfare. 
                                                 
15 In the U.S. these are called 401k plans. 
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Extending this line of reasoning, and assuming that advances in neuropsychology give us a much 
better sense of individual psychology, from a society’s point of view, there may well be a 
determinable optimal set of tastes, and policy can be devoted to achieving that optimal set of 
tastes in order to optimize social welfare.  
  Economists as a group, even liberal ones, would, I suspect, be very much against such 
paternalistic policies. It is in fundamental opposition to the grand liberalist tradition of 
economics. The public, however, would probably be far less concerned since economists are 
usually much more hesitant about paternalistic policies than is the general public. My point is not 
that economics should support paternalist policies; my point is that, in principle, given that one 
accepts a behavioral foundation of economics, that hesitancy to accept paternalistic policies is 
not based upon deductive theory, since the underlying model that grounded that view has been 
eliminated when one gave up rationality. Within the new model of endogenous tastes, agents can 
be made better off, even in their own minds, by government paternalistic actions, because 
agent’s actions do not reveal their true desires. Thus, the end result of giving up the holy trinity 
and adopting a behavioral foundation for economics is a much more complicated set of policy 
arguments, where right and wrong policy will be harder to characterize, and alternative 
explanations of economists’ fear of paternalism will become part of the policy analysis.
16 Policy 
analysis will require muddling through as best one can using the technical tools available. 
The More Distant Future 
  The above discussion has focused on the near term future, and issues that I believe will 
likely be in debate over the coming decade or two. Let me conclude the paper with some brief 
discussion of the longer-term future of the profession, and whether an economics profession will 
survive its movement away from the holy trinity. I predict that it will not, at least in the structure 
that we know it. The reason is that as economics moves away from its holy trinity assumptions, 
more and more cross specialization will occur. New hybrid fields will develop: 
psychoeconomics, neuroeconomics, socioeconomics, bioeconomics, and a variety of others. The 
training, and tools of each will differ, pulling the profession apart. Without the holy trinity of 
assumptions holding it together, the profession will ultimately loose it coherence as a single 
field. It will exist, but as loose associations of different approaches, such as what one finds in the 
field of psychology today.  
  At the same time that research specialties will be pulling the profession apart, so too will 
the policy applications, because they will be each institution specific. New, specific policy 
subfields, such as health economics, macro-forecasting economics, and forensic economics will 
increase in importance. What will hold these various branches together will no longer be an 
adherence to the holy trinity in approaching problems, but instead a shared set of applied 
mathematical tools such as game theory, statistical methods, and experimental methods. But 
these methods transcend disciplines, and will likely be shared by an increasing portion of other 
social scientists. Without assumptions and methods to differentiate economics from the other 
social sciences the study of social issues will become more and more transdisciplinary. 
                                                 
16 In the muddling through approach that I have been advocating (Brock and Colander (2000) an important 
limitation on policy is policy makers ability to understand the effects of any policy in a complex system.  
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Ultimately, there will no longer be psychologists, sociologists and economists, but simply social 
scientists, who can be divided up in a variety of ways that are impossible to predict. 
  So what I am predicting is that there will be a redefinition of the boundaries between 
economics, and other social sciences. As that happens economics work will become more 
specialized as different fields become separate fields in their own right, and are no longer taught 
under the general “economics” umbrella. For example, macro will become integrated with 
complex systems study, and will be seen as a fundamentally different field from health 
economics, which in turn will be seen as a different field from, say public finance. It will become 
less specialized because the new sub-fields in economics will cross current disciplinary 
boundaries, with the training in the various social science and related fields such as psychology, 
and applied mathematics, becoming intertwined.  
  My second prediction concerns the nature of modeling that will likely predominate in the 
future. Behavioral economics, which involves a challenge to the rationality and greed 
assumptions, is currently having the biggest impact on economics. But that, in my view, is 
simply a precursor of a larger change in method and analysis that will follow. That larger change 
involves the third pillar of economics—equilibrium. Accepting a behavioral foundation of 
economics requires one to give up equilibrium because the interactions become too complex to 
analytically solve for equilibrium. To overcome this problem economists are now developing 
agent-based models, in which researchers grow a model of the economy. They will create virtual 
economies, in which virtual agents are endowed with behavioral characteristics that will become 
more and more similar to real world agents.
17 These models require no analytic specification of 
equilibrium, simply a specification of the behavioral characteristics of agents. Model simulation 
is relied upon to determine what likely basins of attractions will be.  
  Work on such models is currently being done in a number of areas. To give a sense of 
what is to come, consider the work being done in finance. There economists have created models 
in which agents choose strategies from a set of strategies similar to those followed by individuals 
on the street. Through multiple computer runs insight is gained about how such a system 
operates. The system has no equilibrium and each run may be different, but one can get a 
probabilistic sense of what will happen by repeated simulation. The results of that simulation are 
then calibrated to real world data to determine the probabilistic accuracy of the simulation.
18  
  These agent-based models are still in their infancy, but in my view they will become 
central to how economic is done in the future. As long as the computing power continues to 
double every 18 months, deriving information from agent based models will become less and 
less expensive, and will eventually become more and more important as a tool of policy makers 
when testing implications of certain policies.
19 Ultimately, a set of computer simulation models, 
which embody the essential observations of the experimental and empirical data, will form the 
                                                 
17 See Robert Axtell and Josh Epstein (1996) and Robert Axelrod (1997) for an early attempt at such a model.  
18 See Blake LeBaron, et al (1999) for examples and discussion. 
19 When I say that these agent based models will become the primary tool of policy makers, I am not suggesting that 
they will operate in lieu of other models. Behavioral insights endowed into the agents will still come from 
experimental work, and calibration of the models to real world data through statistical means will still be 
necessary. 
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theoretical basis of each of these the various new fields that have evolved out of what was once 
economics, and those models will be supplemented by a study of statistical methods to extract 
information from data, and a study of the institutions specific to each sub field.  
Concluding Comments 
  Fields of study are often presented to students as static. The hypothesis of this paper is 
that economics is anything but static, and is composed of many different strains that are 
continually changing. Ultimately, it is the analytic and computing technology that will determine 
how this change occurs and the approach to research that social scientists will follow. Because 
technology is changing, significant changes are likely for economics in the future.  
  These changes will show up in research and in field courses first; I do not see them 
occurring any time quickly in the textbooks. The reason is that the principles course is itself 
marked by some of the same complexity. From a complexity point of view, slowness is probably 
for the best. The reason is that the principles, and even the intermediate textbooks, are not 
written for future economists; they are written for future citizens and businesspeople. For all its 
problems with serving as a vision for economic theorizing, the current efficiency textbook model 
being taught serves these students well.
20 The undergraduate economics course is designed to 
add value to the understanding of these normal students, and the current structure does that. True, 
it doesn’t prepare them to be scientists, or even to have a sense of what real science is, but almost 
none will not go on to be scientists; they will go into business, where the lessons they currently 
learn in principles of economics—that there are opportunity costs to every decision and that there 
is no such thing as a free lunch--pay high dividends. This leads me to believe that the movement 
to a new economics, which I believe will occur, may also undermine one of the primary roles 
economics teaching currently plays today in the university curriculum. What will replace it, I do 
not know; as with all change, there are both costs and benefits.  
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